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I. INTRODUCTION
In March of 2011, the European Commission (E.C.) proposed that
the member states of the European Union allow corporations to elect a
harmonized corporate income tax.' A particularly interesting feature of
the proposal is that income would be allocated among the member states
using a mathematical apportionment formula rather than, as currently is
the law, by determining the source of income on a case-by-case basis.'
1. The author would like to thank Professor Stephen Shay for his comments, particularly
since he disagrees with much of what is herein.
2. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
(CCCTB), at 10, COM (2011) 121 [hereinafter E.C. Proposal]; Commission Staff Working
Document: Impact Assessment: Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Council Directive
on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), SEC (2011) 315 final (Mar. 16, 2011)
[hereinafter E.C. Impact Assessment]. As discussed in more detail in Notes 7 and 8, infra, this
article does not take into account the electivity features of the E.C. proposal, and so views it as
applying to all business in the E.U.
3. E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 49. Allocation would only apply with regard to
multinational business. Multinational passive investment (investment not through a related party
or permanent establishment) would continue to be subject to traditional "withholding taxes." E.C.
Proposal, supra note 2, at 39. For this reason, this article focuses on sourcing for purposes of
taxing active businesses. Sourcing issues for purposes of withholding taxes are usually viewed as
involving the same concerns, but do not necessarily. Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. &
Robert J. Peroni, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: "What's Source Got to Do With It?": Source
Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REv. 81, 146-54 (2002).
European countries generally tax only locally-sourced income. See generally Paul W.
Oosterhuis, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., Kimberly Tan Majure, LaBrenda Garrett-Nelson & Francis
Grab, Territorial Tax Study Report, NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL (June 11, 2002), http:/Iwww.
nftc.org/defaultffax%20Policy/06_13_02_TerritorialTaxStudy-Report.pdf. The U.S. taxes
foreign persons only on (i) some U.S-sourced passive income, (ii) U.S. wages, and (iii) income
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business, which consists almost entirely of U.S.-sourced
active income. See I.R.C. §§ 871, 881 (2006). U.S. bilateral income tax treaties cut this taxation a
bit when applicable. In contrast, the U.S. taxes U.S. persons on worldwide income, but a credit is
allowed for foreign taxes on foreign-sourced income. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 902 (2006). The credit
is limited to the U.S. tax on foreign-sourced income. I.R.C. § 904 (2006). As a consequence of the
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The E.C. proposal presents a number of interesting and important issues.
One of the most interesting is how the apportionment feature of the pro-
posal would impact business risk-taking within the European Union.'
This article agrees and goes further to note that, by making the E.U. a
more attractive location for investment, the E.C. proposal would put the
U.S. at a competitive disadvantage.'
The next section of this article explains the E.C. proposal and pro-
vides some context. This is followed by a section that discusses how an
income tax impacts risky investments in the one-country case. Then, the
cross-border case is reviewed. This discussion illustrates the benefits of
the E.C. proposal. The succeeding section of this article considers the
significance of all this to the U.S. and any possible U.S. response. A
conclusion follows. For the reader interested in understanding the gen-
eral policy foundation for formula apportionment, this is discussed in
this article's appendix.
II. FORMULA FOLLOWS FUNCTION?
One goal of the European Union is to reduce legal obstacles to
doing business across member states. Part of this project is to eliminate
tax frictions to cross-border business.6 To this end, the European Com-
operation of this limit, any U.S. company whose average foreign tax rate (determined under U.S.
principles) exceeds the U.S. rate is effectively U.S. tax-exempt on an additional dollar of foreign-
sourced income. The extra dollar generates U.S. tax, but also increases the foreign tax credit by
the same amount so that there is no net increase in U.S. tax. On 2006 returns, U.S. companies had
almost $108 billion of creditable taxes, but were only allowed $78 billion in foreign tax credits.
Nuria E. McGrath, Corporate Foreign Tax Credit, 2006, 30 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 118, 118,
133 (2010). (This analysis was motivated by James R. Hines, Jr., No Place Like Home: Tax
Incentives and the Location of R&D by American Multinationals, 8 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 65,
101-02 (1994).) Additionally, foreign-sourced income earned by a U.S. person through a foreign
corporation is generally taxed by the U.S. only when repatriated to the U.S. (through dividends,
interest, royalties, and the like). Interestingly, while some U.S. corporations had a total of $30
billion of uncredited foreign income taxes (including carryovers from past years), other U.S.
corporations paid roughly the same amount, $30 billion, in U.S. tax on foreign-sourced income.
McGrath, supra, at 135. Note that apportionment is merely a sourcing rule, not the entire
international tax regime. As to active business income, apportionment can be used both under a
territorial system, like those in Europe, or under a foreign tax credit system, like that in the U.S.
4. See E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 5. O.E.C.D. tax policy officials have problems with
the apportionment aspect of the E.C. proposal. Joseph L. Andrus, Mary C. Bennett & Caroline
Silberztein, The Arm's-Length Principle and Developing Economies, 20 TRANSFER PRICING REP.
495 (2011).
5. In this context, a country's "competitive advantage" is a feature of the country's tax
system that encourages more investment or other business activity in the country than would occur
in the absence of the tax provision.
6. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the
European Economic and Social Committee: An Internal Market Without Company Tax Obstacles,
Achievements, Ongoing Initiatives and Remaining Challenges, at 3-6, COM (2003) 726 final
(Nov. 24, 2003); Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
and the Economic and Social Committee: Towards an Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles: A
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mission proposed a common consolidated corporate income tax base:
Every corporation doing business in the European Union would be
allowed to elect7 to use one common measure of taxable income for the
purpose of determining its tax obligation to all member states of the
European Union.' This would simplify tax compliance and eliminate the
existing inconsistencies in tax treatment (which can result in partial
double taxation or tax exemption), which undermine trade. The determi-
nation of the amount of worldwide income that is treated as E.U. income
would be made under existing practice-transfer pricing.' Then, the
question arises as to how the common E.U. tax base would be allocated
among the member states. Current law, which involves separately
accounting for each geographic piece of the multinational enterprise,
was rejected. The European Commission proposed formula apportion-
ment. It was decided not to allocate on the basis of either macro-eco-
nomic factors or local value added.' 0 The suggested formula uses three
taxpayer-specific factors:
Local Base = EU Base X
1 Local Sales I Local Payroll I Local E'ees 1 Local Property
3 EU Sales 3 2 EU Payroll 2 EU E'ees 3 EU Property
The total amount of income in the E.U., the "EU Base," would be appor-
tioned among the member states by the formula in order to determine
Strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for Their EU-Wide
Activities, at 10-21, COM (2001) 582 final (Oct. 23, 2001).
7. The E.C. indicates that this election is provided so that one-nation businesses are not
burdened with adapting to a new tax regime. E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 5. In the spirit of the
E.C.'s analysis, this article assumes that the proposal would apply to all international business in
the E.U.
8. Id. at 21-22. The E.C. proposal provides that, if the common base is elected, formula
apportionment that mandatorily looks through related corporations-combined reporting-is
required. Id. at 38. (What we in the U.S. call "combined" reporting, the E.C. proposal calls
"consolidated" reporting.)
9. See id. at 23.
10. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), An Overview
of the Main Issues that Emerged During the Discussion on the Mechanism for Sharing the
CCCTB, at 3-5, CCCTB/WP/052/doc/en (Feb. 27, 2007). The E.C. proposal contains special
apportionment rules for financial institutions, insurance undertakings, oil and gas, and air and
water shipping and transport. E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 53-54. This article focuses on the
general three-factor formula.
11. The reader might note that the formula could be simplified by distributing out the three
"1/3d" factors. The presentation above, however, best captures the intuition of three evenly
weighted factors.
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each state's share of the EU Base, the respective "Local Base."' 2 Income
apportioned to a member state would be taxed by that state at the local
rate.' 3 The formula uses three evenly-weighted factors: sales, labor, and
property. The sales factor compares the total sales (in Euros) with a local
destination to the total E.U. destination sales (in Euros). The labor factor
uses two evenly-weighted sub-factors: payroll (in Euros) and number of
employees." First, the local payroll is compared to total E.U. payroll.
Second, the number of local employees is compared to the total E.U.
number. Finally, the property factor compares local tangible assets (at
tax book value) to the total E.U. tangible assets (at tax book value)."
The European Commission identifies reduced compliance costs for
taxpayers and tax enforcement agencies as the principal advantage of its
apportionment proposal.16 Under current law, a business operating in
multiple member states must treat each local piece as if it were free-
standing and each piece must be accounted for separately." Transfer
prices are set for the dealings between the pieces based on a hypothetical
"arm's-length" standard. The Appendix explains that, as to a modem
integrated multinational, there is no economic basis for determining
these hypothetical prices in most cases. As a consequence, determining
these prices and then policing them consumes considerable resources
with no economic point:
12. E.C Proposal, supra note 2, at 14. All income would be subject to apportionment. In
contrast, some U.S. states apportion only passive income. Joann M. Weiner, COMPANY TAX
REFORM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 66 (2006). The general approaches of U.S. states are discussed
in the Appendix.
13. An overall loss would be carried forward to be applied against future years' income and
allocated by the factors in the relevant future years. E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 35.
14. In the U.S. and Canada, the labor input is customarily applied by valuing labor at its cost
(payroll). But, in the E.U., the less well-developed countries argued that their relatively lower
wages would inappropriately limit their tax base under such an allocation formula factor. So, the
European Commission proposed that labor be reflected in any apportionment formula both (i) with
respect to the cost of payroll and (ii) with respect to the number of employees, with the two
components equally weighted. Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group
(CCCTB WG), Report and Overview of the Main Issues That Emerged During the Discussion on
the Sharing Mechanism, at 5, CCTB\WP\056\doc\en (Aug. 20, 2007); Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG), CCCTB: Possible Elements of the Sharing
Mechanism, at 6-9, CCCTB/WPO60\doc\en (Nov. 13, 2007).
There is a considerable irony here: The primary goal of the E.U. is to open markets. Open
markets have freely mobile labor. In theory, if labor were freely mobile within the E.U., the (risk-
adjusted) wage differential between the member states would not exist. Under these
circumstances, the E.C.'s adoption of a number-of-employees factor testifies that the E.U. still has
a long way to go in achieving an open E.U. labor market.
15. For purposes of the property factor, an ad hoc capitalization of research and development
(R&D) expense is provided, but the location thereof is not specified, perhaps since it is assumed to
be situated in the locality where the R&D is incurred. See E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 51.
16. E.C. Impact Assessment, supra note 2, at 32-43.
17. See generally Weiner, supra note 12, at 3-4.
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A key obstacle in the single market today involves the high cost of
complying with transfer pricing formalities using the arm's length
approach. Further, the way that closely-integrated groups tend to
organise themselves strongly indicates that transaction-by-transaction
pricing based on the 'arm's length' principle may no longer be the
most appropriate method for profit allocation."
These extra costs are not present in a purely local business, so that these
costs discourage cross-border business." (Of course, taxpayers' ability
to game transfer pricing can create an incentive for multinational opera-
tion.20 ) The costs of transfer pricing are particularly troublesome with
regard to small- and medium-sized businesses.2' The E.C. Staff Impact
Assessment bases its estimates here on detailed business financial data
collected in a Deloitte poll of tax experts and in a Price-
waterhouseCoopers poll of multinational companies located in the Euro-
pean Union.2 2
No change in national revenues is intended by the E.C. proposal.23
Nevertheless, the Staff Impact Assessment estimates material changes,
from a loss of nearly 40% for Finland to a gain of nearly 17% for Ger-
many.2 4 It is expected that these base changes would be offset by rate
changes.25 The estimated respective national welfare changes vary also,
from an approximately 1.2% of GDP gain for Belgium to a loss of
approximately 1.6% of GDP for Luxemburg.26
18. E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 4.
19. E.C. Impact Assessment, supra note 2, at 10-11.
20. Id. at 30-31; Marcel Gdrard & Joann M. Weiner, Cross-Border Loss Offset and
Formulary Apportionment: How Do They Affect Multijurisdictional Firm Investment Spending
and Interjurisdictional Tax Competition, 19 (CESifo. Working Paper No. 1004, 2003).
21. E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 8.
22. E.C. Impact Assessment, supra note 2, at 23. Some disagree with the analysis. See, e.g.,
Ernst & Young LLP, COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE TAX BASE: A STUDY ON THE IMPACr
OF THE COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE TAX BASE PROPOSALS ON EUROPEAN BUSINESS
TAXPAYERS (2011).
23. E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 6.
24. See E.C. Impact Assessment, supra note 2, at 30. These changes arise from other changes,
like in depreciation, as well as from apportionment. Two of the big winners (in terms of tax base)
are France and Germany, which likely goes a long way toward explaining their support for the
E.C. proposal. Lee Sheppard, France, Germany Push Europe Closer to CCCTB, WORLDWIDE TAX
DAILY (Apr. 14, 2011).
25. E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 6; E.C. Impact Assessment, supra note 2, at 28-29. The
Impact Assessment based its estimate on financial information from a sample of about 6,700 E.U.
multinational groups in the financial sector and about 2,000 groups in the non-financial sector for
2002 through 2005. Id. at 23. These numbers are for the proposal that pierces veils by requiring a
group combined return in the E.U. Id. at 30.
26. E.C. Impact Assessment, supra note 2, at 136.
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III. DOMESTIC RISK
In order to evaluate how formula apportionment might change risk-
taking, it is necessary to consider how income taxation in a single juris-
diction impacts risk. Discouraging risk-taking is troubling, as it would
undermine economic efficiency.
There are many ways to think about risk. In the tax policy litera-
ture, the analysis frequently starts by looking at how a flat-rate income
tax might influence a taxpayer's choice between either (i) investing in
(buying) a riskless bond or (ii) investing in a risky bond.28 The risky
bond promises a higher rate of interest-"extra" interest-to compen-
sate the investor for the risk of nonpayment of principal and interest. If
the investment works out as hoped, the extra interest is taxed. This alone
would discourage risk-taking. But, if the tax also allows a full deduction
for any principal lost if things do not work out, this would encourage
risk-taking, balancing out the taxation of any extra profit. Even with this
balance, however, an income tax still might impact risk-taking. Taxing
profit and allowing losses reduces the net risk to an investor, which
could change investment decisions (depending on investors' risk prefer-
ences).29 Also, the income tax taking wealth from the investor might
impact her risk aversion."o Nevertheless, it seems pretty clear that bal-
anced taxation of both any extra return and any loss experienced is
required in order for an income tax not to discourage risk-taking. Cur-
rent U.S. law can limit the benefit of losses." Any such limit discour-
ages risk-taking.32
A more interesting example for purposes of this article is a business
that takes risk by creating and bringing to market a new product or ser-
vice. Here, the accounting is trickier. There is no distinct investment,
like buying a bond." Rather, there are costs of research and develop-
ment. Most of these costs, even if viewed as part of an investment, are
27. See Harvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, PUBLIC FINANCE 329-33, 341-43, 346-47 (9th ed.
2010).
28. The classic work here is Evsey Domar & Richard Musgrave, Proportional Income
Taxation and Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. EcON. 388, 389 (1944).
29. Roger Gordon, Taxation of Corporate Taxable Income: Tax Revenues Versus Tax
Distortions, 100 Q.J. EcON. 1, 25-26 (1985); Martin Feldstein, The Effects of Taxation on Risk
Taking, 77 J. POL. EcoN. 755, 763-64 (1969); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Effects of Income, Wealth,
and Capital Gains Taxation on Risk-Taking, 83 Q.J. EcoN. 263, 274 (1969).
30. See Gordon, supra note 29, at 25.
31. See I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (2006).
32. Of course, because a taxpayer can pick and choose when to recognize profits and losses,
there are good reasons to limit the deduction of losses that a taxpayer chooses to recognize while
having unrecognized gains. Nevertheless, a failure to allow real losses discourages risk-taking.
33. An intermediary case is buying a depreciable asset. Here, proper measurement of
depreciation is central to an income tax accommodating risk. See generally Jeremy I. Bulow &
Lawrence H. Summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J. POL. EcON. 20, 22-25 (1984).
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immediately deductible in the U.S. 34 If the business has other income
against which to use the deductions, the investment gets an immediate
tax benefit, which encourages risk-taking. In Europe, research costs gen-
erally are deductible, but development costs sometimes are not.35 The
E.C. proposal would allow expensing of all R&D costs.3 6 One can ques-
tion whether a tax incentive for risk-taking through research and devel-
opment is sound policy, but the incentive is well-established."
Matters are more involved when the relevant income tax has gradu-
ated rates.3 ' To the extent that any loss would be allowed against income
that is taxed at a lower rate than any profit would be taxed, risk-taking is
discouraged and vice versa. Current corporate income taxes, including
those in the U.S., 39 generally have a fairly flat rate (particularly across
years for a given taxpayer), so this concern is not particularly important
in domestic taxation. 4 0 In the cross-border context, however, as dis-
cussed below, the loss and income may be taxed in different jurisdic-
tions with different rate structures, so that the multiple rate problem is
real.
IV. CROSs-BORDER RISK
With the background of the previous section of this article, the
effect of income taxation on cross-border risk-taking, particularly the
impact of the E.C. proposal, can be considered.
Consider the simple bond purchase choice example in the preced-
34. I.R.C. § 174 (2006). The U.S. also has credits for increases in expenses incurred in
expanding research and experimentation activity and for some clinical drug testing. I.R.C.
§§ 41(a), 45C(a) (2006). To encourage R&D, European countries have adopted similar credits or
allow a deduction in an amount in excess of 100% of the actual costs of R&D. See generally Int'l
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, TAX TREATMENT OF RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES
(2004) [hereinafter IBFD]. Of course, allowing a deduction in the year incurred of any amount
thereof that is properly viewed as an economic investment is an incentive. See generally George
Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 1185-92 (1987).
35. IBFD, supra note 34, at 222-30.
36. E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 23. This presumably is a product of the European
Commission's ongoing work to encourage innovation in the European Union. Expert Group on
Impacts of R&D Tax Incentives, Design and Evaluation of Tax Incentives for Business Research
and Development: Good Practice and Future Developments, at 3, 7 (Nov. 15, 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/policy/tax-incentivesen.htm [hereinafter E.C. R&D Expert
Group].
37. See generally Expert Group on R&D Tax Incentives Evaluation, Comparing Practices in
R&D Tax Incentives Evaluation, at 5 (Oct. 31, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-
research/pdf/download-en/rdtax incentives-expert-group-report2008_rtdfinall .pdf;
Mundstock, supra note 34, at 1185-92.
38. See generally David A. Weisbach, Taxation and Risk-Taking with Multiple Tax Rates, 57
NAT'L TAX J. 229, 233-35 (2004).
39. I.R.C. § 11 (2006).
40. Jane Gravelle, International Corporate Income Tax Reform: Issues and Proposals, 9 FLA.
TAX REV. 469, 476 n.16 (2009). Ms. Gravelle's note 16 motivated this article.
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ing section of this article. Assume that the bond will be purchased by a
U.S. person. Interest would be sourced based on the location of the bor-
rower. 4 1 Any loss would be situated in the U.S. 42 Thus, the U.S. bears its
share of the risk of loss although it does not have primary tax jurisdic-
tion over the "extra" interest. Only in the extremely unusual case that the
foreign tax rate on the interest exceeds the U.S. rate is risk discour-
aged.4 3 But, the U.S. is bearing the potential cost of preventing taxes on
foreign investment from discouraging offshore risk."
While the bond choice example has a distinguished pedigree, the
research and development example in the previous section of this article
seems more poignant in the modem global, high-tech economy. Assume
that a U.S. company engages in U.S. research and development in the
hope of creating technology that can be licensed worldwide. The costs of
the R&D can be deducted immediately and most reduce U.S. taxes. 45 If
the project is successful, the royalties are sourced where the technology
is licensed-mostly offshore.' Again, as with the bond example, the
U.S. encourages foreign risk-taking. Matters are worse here, however. In
the bond example, the U.S. has a revenue loss only if there is a realized
41. I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(1), 862(a)(1) (2006). It is assumed that the bond is not held as inventory
by the U.S. person, which inventory status could only be the case with a securities dealer. As
discussed in note 3, supra, the U.S. exercises secondary tax jurisdiction over foreign-sourced
income of U.S. persons. As to the bond example itself, this can be important, since source
countries frequently do no exercise their primary tax jurisdiction over investment interest of
foreign persons. See, e.g., I. R. C. §§ 861(h), 881(c) (2006). However, as discussed in note 3,
supra, (i) many U.S. business usually are effectively U.S. tax-exempt on foreign source active
income and (ii) overall U.S. businesses pay no net U.S. tax on foreign source income (assuming
that all foreign taxes ultimately are credited). Therefore, the instant analysis does not reflect
secondary tax jurisdiction.
42. See I.R.C. § 865(a)(1) (2006).
43. See Gravelle, supra note 40, at 476 n.16.
44. See id.
45. I.R.C. § 174(a) (2006). Many of these deductible costs reduce U.S. tax liability (because
the costs are U.S.-sourced and therefore do not reduce the company's foreign tax credit). See
I.R.C. § 904(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(a)(1) (2011). Under the regulation just cited, R&D
expense is allocated between U.S. and foreign sources (i) partially based on where the R&D
activity is performed and (ii) partially based on sales or gross earned currently in the broad
product category of the technology to be developed. This regulation was adopted with an eye
toward allocating as much of the cost of R&D conducted in the U.S. to domestic sources fairly
generously based on a Treasury model. Treas. Dec. 8646, 60 Fed. Reg. 66502, 66502 (Dec. 22,
1995); Allocation and Apportionment of Research and Experimental Expenditures, 60 Fed. Reg.
27453, 27454 (proposed May 24, 1995); TREASURY DEP'T, Doc. No. 95-5090, TREASURY REPORT
ANALYZES RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. R&D AND FOREIGN INCOME (1995). These sourcing rules
for R&D deductions are of less import as multinational groups of corporations use cost sharing
agreements with regard to R&D activities. Under a cost sharing agreement, all of the corporations
share the cost of R&D and share in the results. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (2011). As to R&D done in
the U.S., a cost-sharing agreement has the effect of creating a smaller U.S. deduction, but all
future foreign benefits can be kept offshore without any issues under I.R.C. § 482.
46. See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(4), 862(a)(4) (2006).
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loss on the (principal of the) bond. In the R&D case, because of the
immediate expensing of the up-front expenditures, the U.S. has a reve-
nue loss even if the taxpayer has no economic loss. Foreign countries
usually get to tax local proceeds, even proceeds that economically
represent a return on the original investment in U.S. R&D.47
Matters are different under the E.C. proposal." In the bond case,
the interest income and any loss would be shared by all relevant coun-
tries (based on the apportionment factors in the respective years that the
deduction is allowed and that the income is earned)."9 A similar sharing
would apply in the R&D case.o Profits and losses would be roughly
matched in the relevant taxing jurisdictions. ("Roughly" because of
year-to-year changes in the respective apportionment factors.)
This risk focus gives another view of one of the key problems in
taxing multinational businesses: the location of the return on intangibles.
The classic example is the R&D example above with the additional
aspect that the multinational transfers the locally-developed technology
into a foreign subsidiary if successful. Here, the U.S. provides tax bene-
fits for the R&D and yet collects little or no tax on any return from the
risk-taking until it is repatriated as dividends from the subsidiary."' Cur-
rent U.S. law tries to limit this strategy by looking through the subsidi-
ary or by imputing a royalty to the parent." These rules, however, only
create foreign-source income. Even any later dividend likely will be
treated as having a foreign source.5 4 Apportionment that looks through
subsidiaries (mandatory "combined" or "consolidated" reporting) would
provide a balanced solution." The deduction and income would be
spread among the relevant taxing jurisdictions using the factors, not, as
currently, (i) as to the deduction, by ham-handed regulations, and (ii) as
to the income, solely by where the technology is used.
The E.C. proposal looks even more desirable once one takes loss
47. There is no offshore tax only in the unusual case where, under a foreign country's tax
system, development costs are capitalized and amortized, so that some later return is not taxed
because it is offset by a deduction for amortization.
48. The basic approach here was motivated by Gdrard & Weiner, supra note 20.
49. This discussion assumes that the bond is held for use in a business so as to be associated
with a permanent establishment. Different issues are presented by purely passive investments. The
E.C. proposal would not change the rules applicable to purely passive investments, so it is
reasonable not to consider the associated issues herein.
50. Interestingly, this is similar to the result today in the U.S. when a group of taxpayers use a
qualifying cost sharing agreement under which the parties share R&D costs and any fruits thereof.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7.
51. Hines, supra note 3, at 76.
52. See I.R.C. §§ 482, 951, 952(a)(2), 954(a)(1), 954(c)(1)(A) (2006).
53. Hines, supra note 3, at 77.
54. I.R.C. § 904(d)(3).
55. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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limitations into account. Most countries, including the U.S., do not give
a refund if a taxpayer has an overall loss (negative taxable income) in a
given year. In the U.S., such an overall loss can be carried back two
years and forward twenty to use against any overall net taxable income
in such years carried to.5 6 (When a carryback is used with respect to a
past year, that triggers a refund.17 ) In Europe, similar carrybacks and
carryforwards are allowed." To the extent that these overall loss limits
reduce the value of (tax savings from) losses, risk is discouraged. Cur-
rently, in the U.S., the foreign tax credit limit59 has the effect that losses
are limited separately with respect to a taxpayer's domestic and foreign
income. 60 As a consequence, an overall loss in either category can
reduce the U.S. tax savings from the loss. In Europe, a foreign loss also
generates limited tax savings.6 1 Under the E.C. proposal, E.U losses
reduce E.U. income and so are limited only if the taxpayer has an overall
E.U. loss. 6 2 The E.C. proposal is less likely to discourage risk-taking
than current law.
This feature of apportionment is one of the reasons that the Euro-
pean Commission was attracted to it. Under current law in the member
states of the European Union, a multinational business is more likely to
invest in risky activities in countries where the multinational has other
income to use any loss against, which usually are the larger countries.6 3
This interferes with commerce between the member states and inappro-
56. I.R.C. § 172 (2006).
57. See I.R.C. § 6411 (2006).
58. EC Impact Assessment, supra note 2, at 13.
59. See supra text accompanying note 3.
60. For a U.S. person, an overall loss in either U.S. or foreign-sourced income reduces U.S.
taxable income. I.R.C. § 63. Thus, a foreign-sourced overall loss immediately reduces U.S. taxes.
See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 55. If there are any later overall foreign profits, however, some of them are
treated as U.S.-sourced for purposes of the limit on creditable foreign taxes. I.R.C. § 904(f). This
reduces the U.S. foreign tax credit limit in the foreign profit year, which recaptures some or all of
the U.S. benefit of the original foreign loss. I.R.C. § 904(a). Conversely, an overall U.S. loss
reduces U.S taxes, which reduces the creditability of foreign taxes for that year (but the foreign
taxes that are not allowed as a credit with respect to the current year carry forward to be used in
later years). I.R.C. § 904(a), (c). If there is a later overall U.S. profit, foreign-sourced income that
increases the amount of creditable foreign taxes is created. I.R.C. § 904(g). So, only in the unusual
cases of (i) an overall U.S. loss not being followed eventually by an overall U.S. profit and (ii) an
overall foreign loss not being followed eventually by an overall foreign profit is the statement ion
the text inaccurate. The foreign tax credit limit applies separately to active and passive income.
I.R.C. § 904(d)(1). But, for purposes of this article, the effect of these baskets is unimportant,
since both the R&D deduction and related income will be in the active basket.
61. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes in the European
Community: Rationale and Implications, 22 TAX POL'Y & EcON. 151, 160-61 (2008).
62. Under the E.C. proposal, an overall loss would be carried forward to be applied against
future years' income, with no carryback. E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 22, 35, 49.
63. McLure, supra note 61, at 160-61.
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priately benefits the larger member states.'
The E.C. proposal would not harmonize tax rates, only tax bases
(electively).65 To the extent that losses are in countries with lower rates
than the rates of the countries where the income is taxed, risk-taking
would be discouraged, and vice versa. Formula apportionment would
soften this effect. Profit and loss would be taxed at one blended rate,
with that rate based on the location of the factors in the relevant years.
As a consequence, there would be fewer obstacles to cross-border
business.6 6
V. U.S. IMPACT
The E.C. proposal would stop at the water's edge: In allocating
income between the U.S. and the E.U., traditional separate accounting
would continue to be used. 6 7 Nevertheless, adoption of the E.C. proposal
would have economic effects in the U.S. In the E.U., businesses would
be able to make more efficient business decisions without artificial tax
obstacles. As a consequence, the E.U. as a whole would become a more
attractive business environment. If the U.S. were to harmonize with the
E.U. proposal, the analysis above suggests that worldwide economic
efficiency would be enhanced, but there is no reason to believe that there
would be a net gain for the U.S. solely from improved worldwide loca-
tion decisions of businesses subject to (or potentially subject to) U.S.
taxation.68
This article has focused on the evocative R&D example. The U.S.
and many countries in the E.U. provide tax incentives for R&D in the
form of a tax credit or an over 100% deduction for R&D expenditures. 69
Most of these incentives only apply to domestic R&D, although the
European Commission has formally expressed concern that such limita-
tions are inconsistent with the goals of the Union.70 The obvious ques-
tion here is whether the effects of these incentives would drown out any
effects from the E.U switching to apportionment. There are two reasons
that the concerns herein still are important: First, the analysis in this
article applies to all activities, not just to activities that qualify for any
64. E.C. Impact Assessment, supra note 2, at 26-27.
65. E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 6.
66. Gdrard & Weiner, supra note 20, at 2.
67. See E.C. Proposal, supra note 2, at 22-23, 38.
68. As discussed in the Appendix, many do believe that the U.S. would gain by switching to
apportionment.
69. See E.C. R&D Expert Group, supra note 36, at 17.
70. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the
European Economic and Social Committee: Towards a More Effective Use of Tax Incentives in
Favour of R&D, at 4, COM (2006) 728 final (Nov. 22, 2006).
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R&D tax incentive. The R&D example just proved helpful in illustrating
the general point. Second, this article looks at the effect of the E.U
switching to apportionment, not on the overall impact of all relevant tax
provisions, including tax incentives for R&D. The effects of adopting
apportionment include (i) the benefits from loss offset and the blended
rates applied to profit and loss as well as (ii) the material benefits from
reducing the costs of complying with transfer pricing, which, after all,
the E.C. itself views as the primary selling point. The impact of these
benefits is important no matter what. In any event, the economic litera-
ture has yet to find that R&D activity incentives, such as an R&D credit
or an over 100% deduction, have a particularly strong impact on the
location of R&D activities."
VI. CONCLUSION
The current worldwide business income tax regime rests on the
assumption that income has a natural source. As the Appendix reviews,
there is no economic basis for determining a geographic location for
most types of income. Under these circumstances, sourcing rules can
have surprising effects. It is well-known that sourcing rules impact
where businesses operate. This article has shown how a change in Euro-
pean sourcing rules can hurt the competitive position of the U.S.
71. See generally Chiara Criscuolo, The Effect of R&D Tax Incentives on Location of R&D
Investment, Annex 1, E.C. R&D EXPERT GROUP (Nov. 15, 2009) at 7 ("However, the econometric
evidence on the role of tax incentives on the location of R&D is still scarce."); Michael Devereux,
The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital, Firms and Profit: A Survey of Empirical
Evidence 40 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation, Working Paper No. 0702, 2006), available at
http://ideas.repec.org/p/btx/wpaper/0702.html. Professor Hines concluded that the U.S. sourcing
rules can have more of an impact on the location of R&D than the explicit U.S. tax incentives for
domestic R&D. Hines, supra note 3, at 101-02.
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APPENDIX
THE CASE AGAINST TRADITIONAL SOURCING AND
FOR FORMULA APPORTIONMENT
The core principle of the current international tax system is that the
primary jurisdiction to tax business income belongs to the country where
the income is sourced.7 2 Unfortunately, as discussed below, there is no
ready way to source most types of income.73 For this reason, some pol-
icy experts and the European Commission now propose replacing the
current case-by-case source rules with general apportionment formulae
for allocating income worldwide.7 ' Formula apportionment has been the
72. There is a large literature on whether source-based taxation is sound policy. Shay,
Fleming & Peroni, supra note 3, at 88-115. Unfortunately, because of uncertainty in the incidence
of a business income tax, this literature is inconclusive. See Maarten F. de Wilde, Some Thoughts
on a Fair Allocation of Corporate Tax in a Globalizing Economy, 38 INTERTAx 281, 294-97
(2010). If a business income tax (whether imposed by the source country or the country where the
ownership of the local business is situated) is borne by capital (because of lower after-tax returns),
that suggests that economic neutrality is advanced when a tax comports with "capital export
neutrality." Under capital export neutrality, a source-based tax by itself is undesirable. In contrast,
if a business income tax is borne by local labor (through lower wages) and/or local consumers
(through higher prices), "capital import neutrality" is desirable, and source-based taxation is
consistent with economic efficiency. If a home-imposed business tax is borne by capital, but a
source-based tax is borne by labor and/or consumers, "national neutrality," both home-based and
source-based taxes make sense. See generally David Hasen, Tax Neutrality and Tax Amenities
(Santa Clara Sch. of Law Digital Commons, Working Paper No. 22, 2011), available at http://
digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/working/22/; Michael S. Knoll, Reconsidering International Tax
Neutrality, 64 TAX L. REV. 99 (2011); George Mundstock, Section 902 Is Too Generous, 48 TAX
L. REV. 281, 283-96 (1993). Moreover, in light of increasing skepticism regarding whether
unilateral reductions in trade barriers benefit the U.S., it is not clear that the U.S. should
unselfishly pursue tax policies that advance worldwide economic efficiency. Michael Graetz, The
David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REv. 261, 280-98 (2001); George Mundstock,
Comment: What's on Second?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1079, 1079-81 (1997).
One concern considered in connection with income sourcing is that local taxes should be
related to local benefits. Lawrence Lokken, What Is This Thing Called Source? 25-31 (Univ. of
Miami Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2011-12, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1795265. But, an analysis of the connection between local taxation and local benefits should also
take the rate of tax into account, as discussed infra note 95.
73. See generally Lokken, supra note 72; Graetz, supra note 72, at 261.
74. Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REv. 593,
599-606 (2010); Walter Hellerstein, International Income Allocation in the Twenty-First Century:
The Case for Formulary Apportionment, 12 INT'L TRANSFER PRICING J. 103, 111 (2005); Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax
Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 510-23 (2009).
The inherent arbitrariness of any such formula was first noted rigorously in Charles E.
McLure, Jr., The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves' Clothing, in THE EcONOMiCS OF
TAXATION 327, 335-36 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980). Professor Weiner
applies Professor McLure's insight to the European Union in making a case for formula
apportionment. Weiner, supra note 12, at 89-98. Because of this arbitrariness, apportionment, per
se, is not likely to have efficiency advantages. See James R. Hines, Jr., Income Misattribution
Under Formula Apportionment, 54 EUR. EcON. REv. 108, 117-18 (2010); Rosanne Altshuler &
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custom of state and local taxing jurisdictions in Canada and the U.S. for
some time."
The classic definition of economic income, which usually is
referred to as the "Schanz-Haig-Simons" definition, is:
Income = Consumption + Change in Wealth.
Under this definition, income is not a thing. Income is a measure of
change over a period. (In the case of an income tax, that period usually
is the taxable year.) And, income is a change with respect to a person,
not a place.7 6 One might think that this should not present problems for
sourcing. After all, in the case of a business, income is just its increase
in wealth-how it did over the relevant period. So, perhaps it is possible
to source business income on the basis of where the business's wealth
increases."
Unfortunately, looking to the location of the taxpayer's wealth is
not a satisfactory sourcing rule. Consider the simple case of a Swiss
consultant who does a large project for a U.S. client. The consultant gets
paid in Euros by check, which check is deposited in her Swiss bank
account. No wealth (other than, perhaps, an intangible right to payment
for services) is created in the U.S. Yet, most would say that the U.S.
should be able to tax the consulting income if it is "earned" in the U.S.
Maybe income should be sourced where it is "earned."
Situating "earning" geographically presents its own set of
problems: Consider our consultant further. Does she earn money where
she is physically located when she performs a specific activity? If she is
able to e-commute from Switzerland to do the work for the U.S. client,
does she avoid U.S. tax jurisdiction? If she happens to do most of the
hard thinking on the project while on vacation in a no-tax Caribbean tax
haven, does she avoid tax altogether? It would seem that the consultant
is benefiting from the U.S. by consulting with a U.S. client, so that the
U.S. should be able to tax her regardless of the happenstance of where
she performs the services. The U.S. certainly should be able to tax her if
Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is It Better than the Current System and are There Better
Alternatives?, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 1145 (2010). The only advantages claimed by the E.C. for its
proposal are lower administrative costs and loss offsetting facilitating more efficient risk-taking.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
75. Weiner, supra note 12, at 17-32, 47-60.
76. Over twenty years ago, Professors Ault and Bradford demonstrated that the Schanz-Haig-
Simons definition of income presents real difficulties for sourcing. Hugh J. Ault & David F.
Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic
Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL EcONOMY 11, 30-33 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds.,
1990).
77. Ault and Bradford point out that current law really is a tax on transactions, not on change
in wealth per se, which further confuses sourcing. Id.
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she works in the U.S., regardless of where she is paid or accumulates
wealth.
Similar concerns are presented by the most frequently discussed
sourcing problem: the income from intangibles. In the example that has
become the focus of policy discussions, a U.S. company develops tech-
nology in the U.S., then transfers the technology to a German subsidiary
of the U.S. company for use in Germany." Which country should tax
the return on the technology? The U.S. has a claim, since the technology
was developed with the support of the laws and the economy of the U.S.
Germany has a basis, because the income of the German subsidiary from
managing and using the technology benefited from the laws and the
economy of Germany."
The economics of the taxation of cross-border income related to
intangibles is closely related to the special problems presented in taxing
multinational enterprises.80 Economists do not fully understand why
these businesses are so profitable. Without this understanding, it is not
possible to source much of their income. The economic research gener-
ally agrees that multinational enterprises are more than the sum of their
parts: Multinational businesses earn extra profits that cannot be attrib-
uted to any of the pieces of the agglomeration. One theory for the extra
profits is that multinational enterprises benefit from economies of
78. For simplicity, this hypothetical does not reflect issues presented by the legal form of, and
consideration for, the transfer.
79. Under current law, the U.S. would try to tax (as foreign-sourced income) much of the
return under the "super-royalty" rule of section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code (enacted in
1984). Germany would allow the German subsidiary a deduction for royalties paid or accrued, but
impose a 10% withholding tax on royalties paid by the German subsidiary to the U.S. Any
German withholding tax would be creditable against the U.S. tax on the super-royalty.
80. A key early article that notes this and its significance to international tax policy is Stanley
I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length, 30 TAX NoTEs 625, 628 (1986).
This insight later was posited in the general literature on multinational business enterprise in
Stanley I. Langbein, A Modified Fractional Apportionment Proposal for Tax Transfer Pricing, 54
TAX NoTEs 719, 722-24 (1992).
81. Professor Chorvat refers to the extra profits as "synergistic" profits. Elizabeth Chorvat,
Forcing Multinationals to Play Fair: Proposals for a Rigorous Transfer Pricing Theory, 54 ALA.
L. REV. 1251, 1272-73 (2003). For example, one debate in the literature is whether multinational
enterprises represent vertical integration of different cross-border activities or horizontal
integration of similar economic activities. David J. Teece, Multinational Enterprise, Internal
Governance, and Industrial Organization, 75 AM. EcON. REv. 233, 233 (1985). Horizontal
integration is more suggestive of the possible business reasons for being multinational per se.
There is considerable evidence of the importance of horizontally-integrated international
businesses. See, e.g., James R. Markusen & Keith E. Maskus, Discriminating Among Alternative
Theories of the Multinational Enterprise, 10 REV. INT'L EcON. 694 (2002). The rise of
outsourcing is further evidence for the centrality of horizontal integration. John H. Dunning &
Sarianna M. Lundan, Institutions and the OLI Paradigm of the Multinational Enterprise, 25 ASIA
PAc. J. MormT. 573, 575 (2008).
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scale, 8 2 perhaps amounting to oligopoly." Such businesses are well-
positioned to game tariffs.84 Another theory is that these enterprises are
best positioned to manage and exploit intangibles." There are institu-
tional advantages in being a multinational corporation.86 Multinationals
have cross-border flexibility that enables them to adapt to various types
of international business risk." One can argue that the post-modem
trend toward outsourcing reflects, at least in part, that multinational busi-
nesses are peeling off merely profitable activities in order to focus on
activities with the potential for extra profit. The problem that multina-
tional businesses pose for source-based taxation was summarized in
1980-1980!-by Justice Blackmun in the course of upholding the con-
stitutionality of the State of Vermont taxing Mobil Oil on an apportioned
part of Mobil's dividends from foreign subsidiaries even though Mobil
had only very limited, mostly retail, operations in Vermont: "[S]eparate
accounting, while it purports to isolate portions of income received in
various States, may fail to account for contributions to income resulting
from functional integration, centralization of management, and econo-
mies of scale.""
Because of these extra profits of multinationals, a key feature of
current international tax law cannot achieve its goal: Presently, a trans-
action between related companies situated in different countries is taxed
based on what an arm's-length price between unrelated businesses
82. For example, there are considerable benefits from having an internal bank. Petr Polak,
"The Centre Holds": From the Decentralised Treasury Towards Fully Centralised Cash and
Treasury Management, 3 J. CORP. TREAS. MGMT. 109 (2010).
83. Teece, supra note 81; see also Stephen H. Hymer, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: A
RADICAL APPROACH (Robert B. Cohen et al. eds., 1979).
84. In fact, the earliest studies of multinational business were by scholars primarily interested
in tariffs and trade, not by scholars focused on industrial organization. Paul R. Krugman, The
"New Theories" of International Trade and the Multinational Enterprise, in THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION IN THE 1980s 57, 62-63 (Charles P. Kindleberger & David B. Audretsch eds.,
1983).
85. See Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and
the Replication of Technology, 3 ORG. ScI. 383, 394-96 (1992); Richard E. Caves, Multinational
Enterprises and Technology Transfer, in NEW THEORIES OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 254,
274-75 (Alan M. Rugman ed., 1982). The dominant role of intangibles, rather than economies of
scale, is advanced in Sourafel Girma & Holger G6rg, Multinationals' Productivity Advantage:
Scale or Technology?, 45 EcON. INQUIRY 350, 359-60 (2007).
86. Dunning & Lunden, supra note 81, at 580-84; see Teece, supra note 81, at 236.
87. Robert Z. Aliber, Money, Multinationals, and Sovereigns, in THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION IN THE 1980s 245, 257-58 (Charles P. Kindleberger & David B. Audretsch eds.,
1983). Amusingly, one key valued-added aspect of a multinational corporation is a treasury
function that, in addition to providing an internal bank (which includes managing foreign currency
risk), also can game local tax laws through artful transfer pricing, a possibility not available to
purely local businesses. Stephen L. Curtis, Transfer Pricing for Corporate Treasury in the
Multinational Enterprise, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 97, 110 (2008).
88. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980).
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would be, not on what actually is charged, because the stated charge can
be manipulated without pre-tax consequences so as to locate the most
income in the lowest tax country. For example, a foreign subsidiary can
pay its U.S. parent a below-market royalty to use technology offshore.
While current law tries to police such transactions by requiring an
arm's-length price (royalty), even such a price, if achievable, does not
reflect the extra profit in a multinational enterprise." So, this key com-
ponent of a cross-border business's profitability can be situated where
the business chooses through artful transfer pricing. 90 Attempts to
police transfer pricing have resulted in amazingly complicated, burden-
some, and unsatisfactory law and administrative practice.91
Because of the difficulties in policing hypothetical arm's-length
prices, U.S. states and Canadian provinces turned to formula apportion-
ment.92 The classic apportionment formula used by many states 93 in the
U.S., historically called the "Massachusetts Formula," 94 has three fac-
tors, property, payroll, and sales, which are weighted equally: 95 One-
third of the taxed business's income is apportioned to the taxing jurisdic-
tion based on the proportion of property located in the jurisdiction com-
pared to the total property of the taxed business. The other two factors
work similarly. This formula is intuitive: Money and labor earn income,
hence the first two factors. Without a market, property and payroll could
not earn money, hence the third factor.
This classic (evenly-weighted, three-factor) formula presented
problems for states that were trying to compete for business. To
89. The U.S. transfer pricing regulations can require a "prof-split" method for determining the
price, which method takes this extra profit into account. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-4(a), -6(a) (2011).
90. The U.S. Subpart F rules place some limits on locating profits in a jurisdiction that has
very little economic connection to a transaction. See I.R.C. §§ 951-965 (2006).
91. Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 74, at 501-09.
92. Weiner, supra note 12, at 17-32, 47-60. Professor McDaniel, in much the same spirit as
the recent E.C. proposal, in 1994 explored an apportioned base for the North American Free Trade
Area. Paul R. McDaniel, Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone, 49 TAX L.
REV. 691, 698-706 (1994).
93. U.S. states usually tax businesses only on income sourced in the state.
94. Ferdinand P. Schoettle, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: THE LAW AND POLICY OF MULTI-
JURISDICTIONAL TAXATION 581-83 (2003).
95. Id. As noted above, any apportionment formula is inherently arbitrary. McLure, supra
note 74, at 334-36. Since arm's-length pricing cannot work and apportionment is inherently
arbitrary, one can conclude that a source-based income tax on cross-border income (particularly
when the relevant countries have different tax rates) is a bad idea. Id. at 341-46. But, complete
repeal is not actively under consideration and the idea of a uniform worldwide rate is in but the
earliest stages of consideration. Professors Baldwin and Krugman point out that a uniform
worldwide rate of tax on the income from capital is inappropriate in light of the differing benefits
different countries provide to agglomerates of business activities situated therein. Richard E.
Baldwin & Paul R. Krugman, Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonisation, 48 EUR. ECON.
REV. 1, 22 (2004).
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encourage businesses to set up or expand local operations, many states
now give extra weight to the sales factor.9 6
The Canadian provinces also use apportionment to share the tax
base attributable to Canadian businesses. A two-factor, evenly-weighted
sales and payroll formula is used. Corporate veils are respected.9 7
Intangibles, by their nature, are hard to identify, locate, and evalu-
ate. For these reasons, intangibles present particular problems for prop-
erty factors in allocation formulae."
Professors Avi-Yonah and Clausing, along with Michael Durst, a
practicing attorney who formerly was in charge of the I.R.S.'s advance
(transfer) pricing agreements program, have proposed a very nuanced
allocation formula: The income of each business activity of a taxpayer
would be apportioned separately. First, the activity's income, up to a
return (profit margin) on expenses (adjusted for all of the respective
local conditions), would be allocated to a country based on a return on
local expenses (again adjusted for local conditions). If the activity has
additional income that is not accounted for by this risk-adjusted return
on expenses, this residual income would be allocated proportionately to
the destination of sales. 99 This proposal might seem complicated, but,
the authors argue, in practice, it would be simpler than the current law's
attempt to find arm's-length prices on a case-by-case basis.
96. Weiner, supra note 12, at 34.
97. Id. at 34, 50, 51, 69-70.
98. Charles E. McLure, Jr., U.S. Federal Use of Formula Apportionment to Tax Income from
Intangibles, 75 TAx Noms 109, 117-18 (1997). There is considerable debate on whether
intangibles should be located where they are developed, where they are administered, or where
they are used.
99. See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 74, at 14.
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